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Abstract. We consider the line planning problem in public transportation,
under a robustness perspective. We present a mechanism for robust line planning
in the case of multiple line pools, when the line operators have a different utility
function per pool. We conduct an experimental study of our mechanism on both
synthetic and real-world data that shows fast convergence to the optimum. We
also explore a wide range of scenarios, varying from an arbitrary initial state (to
be solved) to small disruptions in a previously optimal solution (to be recovered).
Our experiments with the latter scenario show that our mechanism can be used
as an online recovery scheme causing the system to re-converge to its optimum
extremely fast.
1 Introduction
Line planning is an important phase in the hierarchical planning process of every rail-
way (or public transportation) network4. The goal is to determine the routes (or lines)
of trains that will serve the customers along with the frequency each train will serve
a particular route. Typically, the final set of lines is chosen by a (predefined) set of
candidate lines, called the line pool. In certain cases, there may be multiple line pools
representing the availability of the network infrastructure at different time slots or
zones. This is due to variations in customer traffic (e.g., rush-hour pool, late evening
pool, night pool), maintenance (some part of the network at a specific time zone may
be unavailable), dependencies between lines (e.g., the choice of a high-speed line may
affect the choice of lines for other trains), etc.
The line planning problem has been extensively studied under cost-oriented or
customer-oriented approaches (see e.g., [2, 3, 6, 8]). Recently, robustness issues have
been started to be investigated. In the robust line planning problem, the task is to
provide a set of lines along with their frequencies, which are robust to fluctuations of
input parameters; typical fluctuations include, for instance, disruptions to daily opera-
tions (e.g., delays), or varying customer demands. In [7], a game-theoretic approach to
robust line planning was presented that delivers lines and frequencies that are robust
to delays.
A different perspective of robust line planning was investigated in [1]. This perspec-
tive stems form recent regulations in the European Union that introduce competition
and free railway markets for its members. Under these rules the following scenario
4 For the sake of convenience, we concentrate in this work on railway networks, but the
methods and ideas developed can be applied to any public transportation network.
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emerges: there is a (usually state) authority that manages the railway network infras-
tructure, referred to as the Network Operator (NOP), and a (potentially) large number
of Line Operators (LOPs) operating as commercial organizations which want to of-
fer services to their customers using the given railway network. These LOPs act as
competing agents for the exploitation of the shared infrastructure and are unwilling
to disclose their utility functions that demonstrate their true incentives. The network
operator wishes to set up a fair cost sharing scheme for the usage of the shared re-
sources and to ensure the maximum possible level of satisfaction of the competing
agents (by maximizing their aggregate utility functions). The former implies a resource
pricing scheme that is robust against changes in the demands of the LOPs, while the
latter establishes a notion of a socially optimal solution, which could also be consid-
ered as a fair solution, in the sense that the average level of satisfaction is maximized.
In other words, the NOP wishes to establish an incentive-compatible mechanism that
provides robustness to the system in the sense that it tolerates the agents’ unknown
incentives and elasticity of demand requests and it eventually stabilizes the system at
an equilibrium point that is as close as possible to the social optimum.
The first such mechanism, for robust line planning in the aforementioned scenario,
was presented in [1]. In that paper, the following mechanism was investigated (mo-
tivated by the pioneering work of Kelly et al. [4, 5] in communication networks): the
LOPs offer bids, which they (dynamically) update for buying frequencies. The NOP
announces an (anonymous) resource pricing scheme, which indirectly implies an allo-
cation of frequencies to the LOPs, given their own bids. For the case of a single pool
of lines, a distributed, dynamic, LOP bidding and (resource) price updating scheme
was presented, whose equilibrium point is the unknown social optimum – assuming
strict concavity and monotonicity of the private (unknown) utility functions. This de-
velopment was complemented by an experimental study on a discrete variant of the
distributed, dynamic scheme on both synthetic and real-world data showing that the
mechanism converges really fast to the social optimum. The approach to the single
pool was extended to derive an analogous mechanism for the case of multiple line
pools, where it was assumed that (i) the NOP can periodically exploit a whole set of
(disjointly operating) line pools and he decides on how to divide the whole infrastruc-
ture among the different pools so that the resource capacity constraints are preserved;
(ii) each LOP may be interested in different lines from different pools; and (iii) each
LOP has a single utility function which depends on the aggregate frequency that she
gets from all the pools in which she is involved.
The aforementioned theoretical framework demonstrated the potential of converging
to the social optimum via a mechanism (dynamic system) that exploits the selfishness
of LOPs. A significant issue is the speed or rate of convergence of this mechanism.
Since there was no theoretical treatment of this issue, its lack was covered in [1] for
the single pool case via a complementary experimental study. Despite, however, the
significance of the convergence rate issue, the mechanism for the multiple pool case
was not experimentally evaluated in [1].
For the case of multiple line pools, it is often more realistic to assume that each LOP
has a different utility function per pool, since different pools are expected to provide
different profits (e.g., intercity versus regional lines, or rush-hour versus late-evening
lines). Moreover, it seems more natural to assume that each LOP has a different utility
function per pool that depends on the frequency she gets for that pool, rather than a
single utility function that depends on the total frequency she gets across all pools.
In this work, we continue this line of research by further investigating the multiple
pool case. In particular, we make the following contributions: (1) Contrary to the
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approach in [1], we consider the case where each LOP has a different utility function
for each line pool she is interested in, and show how the approach in [1] can be extended
in order to provide a mechanism for this case, too. (2) We conduct an experimental
study on a discrete variant of the new mechanism on both synthetic and real-world data
demonstrating its fast convergence to the social optimum. (3) We conduct an additional
experimental study, on both synthetic and real-world data, to investigate the robustness
of the system in the case of disruptions that affect the available capacity, which may
be reduced (due to temporary unavailability of part of the network), or increased (by
allowing usage of additional infrastructure during certain busy periods). In this case,
we show that the NOP can re-converge (recover) the system to the social optimum
pretty fast, starting from a previous optimal solution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the mechanism
for the case of multiple line pools, where each LOP has a different utility function per
pool. In Sections 3 and 4, we present the main contributions of this work for the multiple
line pool case; namely, the experimental study showing the fast convergence of the new
mechanism, and the robustness of the system in the case of disruptions, respectively.
We conclude in Section 5.
2 Multiple Line Pools: Different Utility Functions per Pool
The exposition in this section follows that in [1]. Although the analysis of our approach
is based on the same methodology as that in [1], we have chosen to present all the
details for making the paper self-contained and for the better understanding of the
experimental studies.
In the line planning problem, the NOP provides the public transportation network
in the form of a directed graph G = (V, L), where V is the node set representing train
stations and important railway junctions, and L is the edge set representing direct
connections or links (of railway tracks) between elements of V . Each edge ℓ ∈ L is
associated with a capacity cℓ > 0, which limits the number of trains that can use this
edge in the period examined. A line p is a path in G.
For our purposes, we assume that there is set K of line pools, where each pool
represents a different set of possible routes (each corresponding to a different period of
the day). We envision the line pools to be implemented in disjoint time intervals (e.g.,
via some sort of time division multiplexing), and also to concern different characteristics
of the involved lines (e.g., high-speed pool, regular-speed pool, local-trains pool, rush-
hour pool, night-shift pool, etc.). The capacity of each resource (edge) refers to its
usage (number of trains) over the whole time period we consider (e.g., a day), and if a
particular pool consumes (say) 50% of the whole infrastructure, then this implies that
for all the lines in this pool, each resource may exploit at most half of its capacity. It
is up to the NOP to determine how to split a whole operational period of the railway
infrastructure among the different pools, so that (for the whole period) the resource
capacity constraints are not violated.
There is also a set P of LOPs, who choose their lines from K. We assume that
each LOP p ∈ P is interested only in one line in each pool (we can always enforce
this assumption by considering a LOP interested in more than one routes as different
LOPs distinguished by the specific route). Each line pool and the preference of LOPs
to lines in it are represented by a routing matrix R(k) ∈ {0, 1}|L|×|P |, k ∈ K. Each row
Rℓ,⋆(k) corresponds to a different edge ℓ ∈ L, and each column R⋆,p(k) corresponds to
a different LOP p ∈ P , showing which edges comprise her line in pool k.
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Each LOP p ∈ P acquires a frequency of trains that she wishes to route over
her paths in R⋆,p(k), k ∈ K, such that no edge capacity constraint is violated by
the aggregate frequency running through it by all LOPs and pools. A utility function
Up,k : R≥0 7→ R≥0 determines the level of satisfaction of LOP p ∈ P in pool k ∈ K
for being given an end-to-end frequency xp,k > 0. Having different utility functions per
pool, instead of a single utility function across all pools, is more generic and hence more
realistic, since a LOP p can indeed have different valuations for different periods of a
day (rush-hour pool vs night-shift pool) and/or different types of trains (high-speed
pool vs local-trains pool). These utility functions are assumed to be strictly increasing,
strictly concave, non-negative real functions of the end-to-end frequency xp,k allocated
to LOP p ∈ P in pool k ∈ K.
The aggregate satisfaction level Up of LOP p ∈ P across all pools is given by the
sum of the individual gains she has in each pool, that is
Up(xp) = Up(xp,1, . . . , xp,k) =
∑
k∈K
Up,k(xp,k), ∀p ∈ P
where xp = (xp,k)k∈K is the vector of frequencies that p gets for all the pools. The
utility functions are private to the LOP; she is not willing to share them for competi-
tiveness reasons, not even with the NOP. This has a few implications on the necessary
approach to handle the problem.
The NOP, on the other hand, wishes to allocate to each LOP a frequency vector
xˆp =
∑
k∈K xˆp,k such that the cumulative satisfaction of all the LOPs is maximized,
while respecting all the edge capacity constraint. To achieve this, the NOP divides the
whole railway infrastructure to the pools, using variables fk, k ∈ K that determine the
proportion of the total capacity of the edges that is assigned to pool k. Hence, the
NOP wishes to solve the following strictly convex optimization problem:
max
∑
p∈P
Up(xp) =
∑
p∈P
∑
k∈K
Up,k (xp,k)
s.t.
∑
p∈P
Rℓ,p(k) · xp,k ≤ cℓ · fk, ∀(ℓ, k) ∈ L×K
∑
k∈K
fk ≤ 1
x,f ≥ 0
(MSC-II)
Clearly, the NOP cannot solve this problem directly for (at least) two reasons: (i)
the utility functions are unknown to him; (ii) the scale of the problem can be too
large (as it is typical with railway networks) so that it can be solved efficiently via a
centralized computation. The latter is particularly important when the whole system
is already at some equilibrium state and then suddenly a (small, relative to the size
of the whole problem) perturbation in the problem parameters occurs. Then, rather
than having a whole new re-computation of the new optimal solution from scratch, it is
particularly desirable that a dynamical scheme allows convergence to the new optimal
solution, starting from this worm start (of the previously optimal solution). All the
above reasons dictate searching for a different solution approach, that has to be as
decentralized as possible.
Optimal Solution. We adopt the approach in [1] to design a mechanism that will be
run by the NOP in order to solve the above problem. In particular, rather than having
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the NOP directly deciding for the frequencies of all the LOPs in each pool, we first
let each LOP make her own bid for frequency in each pool. Then, the NOP consider
the solution of a convex program which is similar, but not identical to (MSC-II), using
a set of (strictly increasing, strictly concave) pseudo-utilities. Our goal is to exploit
the rational (competitive) behavior of the LOPs, in order to assure that eventually
the optimal solution reached for this new program is identical to that of (MSC-II), as
required.
We start by describing the necessary and sufficient optimality (KKT) conditions
for (MSC-II). We study the Lagrangian function and exploit the economic interpre-
tation of the Lagrangian multipliers. Let Λ be the vector of Lagrangian multipliers
for the resource capacity constraints, and ζ the Lagrangian multiplier concerning the
constraint for the capacity proportions per pool. The Lagrangian function of (MSC-II)
is as follows:
L(x,f ,Λ, ζ) =
∑
p∈P
∑
k∈K
Up,k(xp,k)−
∑
ℓ∈L
∑
k∈K
Λℓ,k ·

∑
p∈P
Rℓ,p(k) · xp,k − cℓ · fk

− ζ
[∑
k∈K
fk − 1
]
=
∑
p∈P
∑
k∈K
[
Up,k(xp,k)− xp,k
(∑
ℓ∈L
Λℓ,k ·Rℓ,p(k)
)]
+
∑
k∈K
fk ·
[
cTΛ⋆,k − ζ
]
+ ζ =
∑
p∈P
∑
k∈K
[Up,k(xp,k)− xp,k · µp,k(Λ)] +
∑
k∈K
fk ·
[
cTΛ⋆,k − ζ
]
+ ζ,
where µp,k(Λ) ≡
∑
ℓ∈L Λℓ,k ·Rℓ,p(k). We interpret Λℓ,k to be the per-unit-of-frequency
price of edge ℓ ∈ L in pool k ∈ K. Thus, µp,k(Λ) is the end-to-end per-unit price that
LOP p has to pay for pool k.
The optimality (KKT) conditions for (MSC-II) are the following:
∀(p, k) ∈ P ×K, U ′p,k(xˆp,k) = µˆp,k ≡ µp,k(Λˆ) (KKT-MSC-II.a)
cT · Λˆ⋆,k ≡
∑
ℓ∈L
Λˆℓ,k · cℓ = ζˆ , ∀k ∈ K (KKT-MSC-II.b)
Λˆℓ,k

∑
p∈P
Rℓ,p(k)xˆp,k − cℓfˆk

 = 0, ∀(ℓ, k) ∈ L×K (KKT-MSC-II.c)
ζˆ ·
(∑
k∈K
fˆk − 1
)
= 0 (KKT-MSC-II.d)
∑
p∈P
Rℓ,p(k) · xˆp,k ≤ cℓ · fˆk, ∀(ℓ, k) ∈ L×K (KKT-MSC-II.e)
∑
k∈K
fˆk ≤ 1 (KKT-MSC-II.f)
xˆ, fˆ , Λˆ, ζˆ ≥ 0
These conditions characterize the optimal solution of (MSC-II). From these equations,
one can observe for the optimal solution (xˆ, fˆ) and its accompanying vector of La-
grangian multipliers (Λˆ, ζˆ):
1. By equation (KKT-MSC-II.b) all pools (at optimality) have the same (weighted
with the capacities of the edges) aggregate per-unit-of-frequency cost ζˆ.
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2. By equation (KKT-MSC-II.d) either ζˆ = 0 or
∑
k∈K fˆk = 1. The former case (all
prices are set to zero) cannot actually happen, since otherwise all the pools would
have zero aggregate cost (i.e., every edge is underutilized in every pool). Then we
could slightly increase the frequencies of all the LOPs in all the pools by a positive
constant and keep exactly the same vector of proportions fˆ , which would lead to a
strictly better solution (the utility functions are strictly increasing), contradicting
the optimality of xˆ. Hence, we consider only the case, where at least some resources
have positive costs. In this case, the condition
∑
k∈K fˆk = 1 must hold. Any vector
f for which this condition holds is said to completely divide the infrastructure
among the pools.
Limited Information and Decentralized Mechanism. As already mentioned,
the NOP cannot know the utility functions. Therefore, a slightly different problem is
considered: Each LOP p ∈ P announces (non-negative) bids wp,k ≥ 0 (one per pool),
which she is committed to spend for acquiring frequencies in the pools. Consequently,
the NOP replaces the unknown utility functions with the pseudo-utilities wp,k log(xp,k)
in order to determine a frequency vector that maximizes the aggregate level of pseudo-
satisfaction. Observe that these used pseudo-utilities are also strictly increasing, strictly
concave functions of the LOPs’ frequencies. That means, that NOP wishes to solve the
following (strictly convex) optimization problem that is completely known to him:
max
∑
p∈P
∑
k∈K
wp,k log(xp,k)
s.t.
∑
p∈P
Rℓ,p(k) · xp,k ≤ cℓ · fk, ∀(ℓ, k) ∈ L×K
∑
k∈K
fk ≤ 1
x,f ≥ 0.
(MNET-II)
The optimal solution vector (x¯, f¯ ), along with the corresponding vector of Lagrange
multipliers (Λ¯, ζ¯), must satisfy the following necessary and sufficient optimality (KKT)
conditions for (MNET-II):
∀(p, k) ∈ P ×K, wp,k
x¯p,k
= µ¯p,k ≡ µp,k(Λ¯) (KKT-MNET-II.a)
cT · Λ¯⋆,k ≡
∑
ℓ∈L
Λ¯ℓ,k · cℓ = ζ¯ , ∀k ∈ K (KKT-MNET-II.b)
Λ¯ℓ,k

∑
p∈P
Rℓ,p(k)x¯p,k − cℓf¯k

 = 0, ∀(ℓ, k) ∈ L×K (KKT-MNET-II.c)
ζ¯ ·
(∑
k∈K
f¯k − 1
)
= 0 (KKT-MNET-II.d)
∑
p∈P
Rℓ,p(k) · x¯p,k ≤ cℓ · f¯k, ∀(ℓ, k) ∈ L×K (KKT-MNET-II.e)
∑
k∈K
f¯k ≤ 1 (KKT-MNET-II.f)
x¯, f¯ , Λ¯, ζ¯ ≥ 0
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This problem can of course be solved in polynomial time, given the bid of the LOPs
w = (wp,k)(p,k)∈P×K . Equation (KKT-MNET-II.a) means that the NOP (correctly)
assigns frequency x¯p,k =
wp,k
µ¯p,k
, which is affordable at the (path) per-unit price µ¯p,k for
LOP p who is committed to afford an amount of wp,k for acquiring frequency in pool k.
As already said, (x¯, f¯ ) is the optimal solution for any bid vector declared by the LOPs,
and in particular it also holds for the true bid vector that the LOPs would really wish
to afford.
Observe, also, that problems (KKT-MSC-II) and (KKT-MNET-II) differ only in
equations (KKT-MSC-II.a) and (KKT-MNET-II.a). Our next step is to somehow as-
sure that these two conditions coincide. To this direction, we exploit the rational behav-
ior of the LOPs: Each LOP wishes to maximize her own aggregate level of satisfaction,
therefore, she would declare a bid vector that would actually achieve this. In what fol-
lows, we assume that the LOPs are price takers meaning that each of them considers
the prices announced by the NOP as constants, with no hope of affecting them by their
own bid vector. This property is important in the following analysis, and is realistic
when there exist many LOPs, each controlling only negligible fractions of the total flow
(or bidding process) in the system. We now state and prove an important theorem for
the existence of a mechanism for this problem.
Theorem 1. Given a transportation network G = (V, L), a set of line pools K and
a set P of selfish, price-taking LOPs, each having a private utility function for each
pool with parameter the frequency that is allocated to her in the particular pool, there
is a mechanism (a pair of a frequency allocation mechanism and a resource pricing
scheme) that computes in polynomial time the optimal solution of the sum of the utility
functions of the players, while respecting the capacities of the edges.
Proof. We create the following mechanism. The NOP completely divides the infras-
tructure and, depending on the bids of the LOPs, announces the optimal frequencies
x¯p,k for each LOP p ∈ P and the current resource (edge) prices Λ¯ℓ,k, ∀ℓ ∈ L, k ∈ K.
We have that, x¯p,k =
wp,k
µ¯p,k
. Each (selfish) LOP is interested in solving the following
strictly convex optimization problem:
max
∑
k∈K
(Up,k(x¯p,k)− wp,k) =
∑
k∈K
(
Up,k
(
wp,k
µ¯p,k
)
− wp,k
)
s.t. wp,k ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K
(MUSER-II)
That is, she tries to maximize the utility she gets over the frequency she will be granted
by the NOP, after subtracting the bid she has to pay for this frequency.
Due to the price taking property of LOP p, we can obtain the solution of the
(MUSER-II) by differentiating the objective function and setting every partial deriva-
tive equal to zero:
∂
∂wp,k
∑
k∈K
(
Up,k
(
wp,k
µ¯p,k
)
− wp,k
)
= 0, ∀k ∈ K
we get
U ′p,k
(
wp,k
µ¯p,k
)
· 1
µ¯p,k
− 1 = 0⇒ U ′p,k (x¯p,k) = µ¯p,k
However, this is the set of equations (KKT-MSC-II.a) of the KKT conditions for
the (MSC-II) problem. That is, every LOP chooses the bids in a way that matches the
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equation (KKT-MSC-II.a). But this will happen in the optimal solution of (MNET-II)
as well. Therefore, the selfish choice of bids by the LOPs enforces the identification of
the optimal solution of MSC-II and MNET-II. I.e., we have managed to delegate the
problem of choosing the optimal bids in each iteration to the LOPs and, in doing so,
we have matched the first equation of the optimality conditions of MSC-II. ⊓⊔
This polynomially tractable mechanism (based on the solvability of MNET-II) is
totally centralized and rather inconvenient for a dynamically changing (over time),
large-scale railway system. The following lemma (whose proof can be found in the
Appendix) is crucial in deriving a dynamical system for solving (MSC-II).
Lemma 1. For any (fixed) vector f of capacity proportions that completely divides
the railway infrastructure among the pools, the optimal value of (MSC-II) exclusively
depends on the optimal vector Λ¯ of the per-unit-of-frequency prices of the resources.
The above lemma suggests the following mechanism.
1. For every line pool k ∈ K, solve an instance of the single-pool case, using the
decentralized mechanism in [1], obtaining the optimal solution (x⋆,k,Λ⋆,k).
2. The NOP calculates the cost of each pool and sets the variable ζ(t) to the average
pool cost:
ζ(t) =
1
|K|
∑
k∈K
cT ·Λ⋆,k(t).
Then, he updates the capacity proportion vector f and assigns a larger percentage
of the total capacity to the most “expensive” line pools, so that their cost decreases.
This update is described by the following differential equations:
∀k ∈ K, f˙k(t) = max{0, cT ·Λ⋆,k(t)− ζ(t)}. (1)
Note that, at the end, the vector f must be normalized, such that
∑
k∈K fk = 1
(the proportion vector must completely divide the infrastructure at all times). This
is done by dividing each fk(t) by
∑
k∈K fk(t).
Roughly speaking, the convergence of the above mechanism for a specific capacity
proportion vector f is guaranteed by the convergence of the single-pool algorithm.
Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we present the convergence proof in the
Appendix (Lemma 2). When the |K| single-pool instances are solved, the NOP updates
the vector f , so that the expensive pools get cheaper. The goal is that all pools should
have the same cost. When this happens, we know for the optimal solution of both
MNET-II and MSC-II (x¯, f¯ ) and the accompanying Lagrange multipliers, (Λ¯, ζ¯), that:
– Equations (KKT-MNET-II.a) and (KKT-MSC-II.a) will match due to the fact that
each LOP solves the (MUSER-II) problem.
– Equations (KKT-MNET-II.b) (and (KKT-MSC-II.b)) will be satisfied due to the
updates to vector f that take place at the end of each phase.
– Equations (KKT-MNET-II.c) (and (KKT-MSC-II.c)) will be satisfied due to the
resource price updating scheme chosen.
– Equations (KKT-MNET-II.d) (and (KKT-MSC-II.d)) will be satisfied, because the
NOP assures that at the end of each phase.
Hence, (x¯, f¯ ) is the optimal solution of both (KKT-MSC-II) and (MNET-II), and
thus the proposed mechanism solves (MSC-II). The next theorem summarizes the pre-
ceding discussion.
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Theorem 2. The above dynamic scheme of resource pricing, LOPs’ bid updating and
capacity proportion updating assures the monotonic convergence of the (MNET-II)
problem to the optimal solution. The algorithm may start from any initial state of
resource prices, LOPs’ bids and capacity proportion vector.
3 Experimental Study of the Multiple-Line Pool Cases
In this section we present the experimental results for the multiple-line pool case where
the LOPs have different utility functions per pool. We have implemented a discrete ver-
sion of the decentralized mechanism, whose pseudocode is as follows.
fk(0) =
1
|K| ;
repeat
t = t+ 1;
for all k ∈ K do
Solve an instance of the single-pool case for each line pool k;
end for
costk(t) = c
T ·Λ⋆,k(t);
ζ =
∑
k∈K
costk
|K| ;
for all k ∈ K do
f˙k(t) =
max{0,costk(t)−ζ(t)}
ζ(t) ;
fk(t) = fk(t− 1) + 0.1 · f˙k(t);
end for
total f =
∑
k∈K fk(t);
for all k ∈ K do
fk(t) =
fk(t)
total f ;
end for
until equal costs(cost(t))
The algorithm was implemented in C++ using the GNU g++ compiler (version 4.4)
with the second optimization level (-O2 switch) on. Experiments were performed on
synthetic and real-world data.
Synthetic data consisted of grid graphs having a number of 7 nodes on the vertical
axis and a number of nodes in [120, 360] along the horizontal axis; i.e., the size of the
grid graphs varied from 7 × 120 to 7 × 360. The capacity of each edge was randomly
chosen from [10, 110). Four line pools were defined. In each pool, there were three LOPs,
each one interested in a different line. Those lines had the first edge ((0, 3), (1, 3)) in
common. The next edges of each line were randomly chosen each time.
Real-world data concern parts of the German railway network (mainly intercity
train connections), denoted as R1 (280 nodes and 354 edges) and R2 (296 nodes and
393 edges). The capacities of the edges were in [8, 16]. The total number of lines varies
from 100 up to 1000, depending on the size of the networks. For each network, we
defined four line pools. The second, third and fourth pool differed from the first in
about 10% of the lines (the new lines in each pool were randomly selected from the
available lines in each network).
In the experiments we measured the number of iterations needed to find the correct
vector f of capacity proportions (we did not concentrate on the solutions of the single-
pool case, used as a subroutine, since this case was investigated in [1]). We investigated
the following four scenarios:
S1: Up,1(xp,1) = 10
4√xp,1 and Up,2(xp,2) = 104√xp,2, ∀p ∈ P .
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S2: Up,1(xp,1) =
3
4 · 104 ·
√
xp,1 and Up,2(xp,2) =
4
5 · 104 ·
√
xp,2, ∀p ∈ P .
S3: Up,1(xp,1) = 10
4 · √xp,1 and Up,2(xp,2) = 12 · 104 ·
√
xp,2, ∀p ∈ P .
S4: Up,1(xp,1) = 10
4 · √xp,1 and Up,2(xp,2) = 14 · 104 ·
√
xp,2, ∀p ∈ P .
We report on experiments with the R1 network and two line pools for all four scenarios,
and on R2 for scenarios S1 and S2 (similar results hold for the other scenarios). Table 1
shows the results for 100, 200 and 300 lines per pool for R1, and for 100 to 500 lines per
pool for R2. For S1 (same utility functions), we observe a small number of necessary
Number of lines S1 S2 S3 S4
100 9 33 127 178
200 12 33 127 178
300 19 29 128 178
Number of lines S1 S2
100 33 52
200 26 49
300 1 40
400 6 34
500 1 37
Table 1: Number of updates of f for different utility functions and number of lines per
pool (|K| = 2) for R1 (left) and R2 (right).
updates to the capacity proportion vector f , until the system reaches the optimum.
The main reason for this is the use of the same utility function for every pool by the
LOPs, because the algorithm starts with the initial values fk =
1
|K| and the optimal
values in this case are quite close to these initial values. For the other scenarios with
different utility functions per pool (S2, S3, S4), we observe a larger number of the
updates required. We also observe that the more different the utility functions of each
LOP in the two pools are, the larger the number of updates required to reach the
optimum.
Another interesting observation in the case of the different utility functions per
line pool, is that the number of updates of f is almost equal. This is due to the fact
that the difference in utility functions across line pools has a more significant effect on
the required number of updates than the difference in lines among the pools (in other
words, more steps are required to reach the optimal values due to the different utility
functions than due to the different costs of the line pools).
In conclusion, the number of updates required by our mechanism to converge (to
the optimal values of vector f) depends largely on the exact parameters of the system
of differential equations (1).
4 Experimental Study of Disruptions in the Network
We turn now to a different experimental study. We assume that the network is currently
operating at optimality and that a few disruptions occur. These disruptions affect the
capacity of some edges. This can be due to technical problems leading to reducing
the capacity of those edges, or to increasing their capacity for a particular period to
handle increased traffic demand (e.g., during holidays, or rush hours) by “releasing”
more infrastructure.
We examine the behavior of the algorithms for the single and multiple pool cases
in such situations. We investigated three disruption scenarios:
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D1: Reducing the capacity of a certain number of edges (chosen among the congested
ones).
D2: Increasing the capacity of a certain number of edges (chosen among the congested
ones).
D3: Reducing the capacity of a certain number of edges, while increasing the capacity
of an equal number of a different set of edges (chosen among the congested ones).
We start from a known optimal solution to the problem. Then, we add disruptions to a
few edges and apply the algorithm. The relative and absolute error for the differential
equations were set to 0.1.
These scenarios were tested on grid graphs and on the R1 network (similar results
hold for R2). For the grid graphs, the lines were chosen randomly, but all of them
shared the same first edge. The number of lines in each pool were 10 and the capacities
of the edges were chosen randomly in [4, 20].
4.1 Single pool case
For this case, we chose randomly, among the congested ones, 4 edges in the case of
grid graphs and 10 edges in the case of R1. Their capacity was reduced (or increased)
by 10% and 50%. In the experiments we measured the number of updates required for
finding the optimal values of Λ (resource prices per-unit-of-frequency).
The number of iterations required for finding the optimal values of Λ for grid
graphs and R1, when we start from a previous optimal solution, is presented in Tables
2 and 3. For comparison, the number of the required updates of Λ when we start from a
random initial state is given in Tables 4 and 5. We observe the significantly less number
of updates required when we start from a previous optimal solution. This is due to the
fact that the disruptions caused are not very big, and hence the new optimal solution
is quite close to the previous one. There are, however, one or two exceptions; i.e., we
observe in these cases a smaller number of updates when we start from a random
initial solution. This happens, because the algorithms for solving differential equations
are arithmetic methods that depend greatly on the exact parameters given. This results
in a few pathological cases such as these. One can conclude, though, that in general
the use of the previous optimal solution leads to a smaller number of required updates
for Λ.
4.2 Multiple pool Case
We created two pools for these experiments. In the case of grid graphs, the lines in each
pool were chosen randomly, and in the case of R1 there was a 10% difference in the
lines between the two pools. In these experiments we measured the number of updates
of the bids of the LOPs (bid vector w). In none case there was a need to update the
capacity proportion vector f .
The results are shown in Tables 6 and 7. One can see that only rarely there is a
need to update the bid vector w. Especially for the R1 network, we had to introduce
disruptions of 90% of the original capacity to get the bid vector to be updated. Hence,
the algorithm reaches the optimal solution quite fast. The important observation is
that, starting from the previous optimal solution, we avoid the update of the capacity
proportion vector f , which is the most expensive operation.
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Disruption p D1 D2 D3
10%
120 1292 340 9983
180 1235 395 550
240 317 453 407
300 4005 556 1337
360 163 8484 542
50%
120 403 480 1022
180 248 1116 875
240 409 498 533
300 3966 1284 1180
360 751 658 712
Table 2: Required number of updates of Λ for grid graphs with sizes 7 × p, when the
algorithm starts from a previous optimal state, until the system reaches the equilibrium
point after the disruptions under scenarios D1, D2, and D3.
Disruption Number of lines D1 D2 D3
10%
100 10335 90085 464
200 32466 2806 5033
300 4171 276 5208
50%
100 8409 1057 1506
200 1042 1109 4314
300 5430 974 1058
Table 3: Required number of updates ofΛ for R1, when the algorithm starts from a pre-
vious optimal state, until the system reaches the equilibrium point after the disruptions
under scenarios D1, D2, and D3.
5 Conclusions
We have studied a variant of the robust multiple-pool line planning problem defined
in [1], where the LOPs have different utility functions per pool. We have shown that
a dynamic, decentralized mechanism exists for this problem that eventually converges
to the optimal solution.
We have also studied the above mechanism experimentally, showing that the exact
behavior of the algorithm greatly depends on the exact input parameters; however, the
convergence is in general quite fast.
Moreover, we studied the case that disruptions take place in the network. We have
seen that in most cases it is much better to take advantage of the previous (optimal)
solution to bootstrap the algorithm.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The Lagrangian function of the problem is:
L(x,f ,Λ, ζ) =
∑
p∈P
∑
k∈K
[Up,k(xp,k)− xp,k · µp,k(Λ)] +
∑
k∈K
fk ·
[
cTΛ⋆,k − ζ
]
+ ζ.
The dual problem of (MSC-II) is the following:
max D(Λ, ζ)
s.t. Λℓ,k ≥ 0 ∀ℓ ∈ L, ∀k ∈ K
ζ ≥ 0,
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where
D(Λ, ζ) =
= max {L(x,f ,Λ, ζ) : x,f ≥ 0}
= max
x,f≥0


∑
p∈P
∑
k∈K
[
Up,k(xp,k)− xp,k
∑
l∈L
Λℓ,kRℓ,p(k)
]
+
∑
k∈K
fk
[∑
ℓ∈L
Λℓ,kcℓ − ζ
]
+ ζ


= max
x≥0


∑
p∈P
∑
k∈K
[Up(xp)− xp,kµp,k(Λ)]

+maxf≥0
{∑
k∈K
fk
[∑
ℓ∈L
Λℓ,kcℓ − ζ
]}
+ ζ.
For the part
P1(Λ) = max
x≥0


∑
p∈P
[
Up(xp)−
∑
k∈K
xp,k · µp,k(Λ)
]

we have, that it is a simple maximization problem the solution of which depends ex-
clusively on the optimal vector of resource prices Λ¯.
For the part
P2(Λ, ζ) = max
f≥0
{∑
k∈K
fk ·
[∑
ℓ∈L
Λℓ,k · cℓ − ζ
]}
+ ζ
= max
f≥0
{∑
k∈K
· (cT ·Λ⋆,k)+ ζ ·
(
1−
∑
k∈K
fk
)}
we have, that at optimality ζ · (1−∑k∈K fk) equals to zero. So, we get:
P2(Λ, ζ) = max
1T f=1: f≥0
{∑
k∈K
fk ·
(
cT ·Λ⋆,k
)}
= max
k∈K
{
cT ·Λ⋆,k
}
= min
{
z : z · 1T ≥ cT ·Λ} .
That is, P2(Λ, ζ) calculates the maximum cost among the pools. This, however, depends
only on the optimal vector of resource prices Λ¯. ⊓⊔
The convergence of our decentralized mechanism is shown by the next lemma.
Lemma 2. For any choice of fixed bid vector w¯ = (wp)p∈P offered by the LOPs, and
any fixed vector of proportions f¯ = (fk)k∈K determined by the NOP, the resource
price updating scheme makes the resource prices converge to the corresponding optimal
vector Λ¯ (for these particular given bids and proportions).
Proof. We use the Lyapunov function
V (Λ(t)) =
1
2
· (Λ(t)− Λ¯)T · (Λ(t)− Λ¯)
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and showing that dV (Λ(t))
dt
≤ 0. Indeed,
dV (Λ(t))
dt
=
=
∑
ℓ∈L
∑
k∈K
(
Λℓ,k(t)− Λ¯ℓ,k
) · Λ˙(t)
=
∑
ℓ∈L
∑
k∈K
(
Λℓ,k(t)− Λ¯ℓ,k
) · [max{0, yℓ,k(t)− cℓf¯k} · I{Λℓ,k(t)=0}
+
(
yℓ,k(t)− cℓf¯k
) · I{Λℓ,k(t)>0}]
≤
∑
ℓ∈L
∑
k∈K
(
Λℓ,k(t)− Λ¯ℓ,k
) · [yℓ,k(t)− cℓf¯k]
=
∑
ℓ∈L
∑
k∈K
(
Λℓ,k(t)− Λ¯ℓ,k
) · [yℓ,k(t)− y¯ℓ,k + y¯ℓ,k − cℓf¯k]
≤
∑
ℓ∈L
∑
k∈K
(
Λℓ,k(t)− Λ¯ℓ,k
) · [yℓ,k(t)− y¯ℓ,k]
=
∑
ℓ∈L
∑
k∈K
(
Λℓ,k(t)− Λ¯ℓ,k
) ·∑
p∈P
Rℓ,p(k) · [xp,k(t)− x¯p,k]
=
∑
p∈P
∑
k∈K
[xp,k(t)− x¯p,k] · (µp,k(t)− µ¯p,k)
=
∑
p∈P
∑
k∈K
[xp,k(t)− x¯p,k] ·
(
w¯p,k
xp,k(t)
− w¯p,k
x¯p,k
)
=
∑
p∈P
∑
k∈K
w¯p,k ·
[
2− xp,k(t)
x¯p,k
− x¯p,k
xp,k(t)
]
≤ 0
The first inequality∑
ℓ∈L
∑
k∈K
(
Λℓ,k(t)− Λ¯ℓ,k
) · [max{0, yℓ,k(t)− cℓf¯k} · I{Λℓ,k(t)=0}
+
(
yℓ,k(t)− cℓf¯k
) · I{Λℓ,k(t)>0}]
≤
∑
ℓ∈L
∑
k∈K
(
Λℓ,k(t)− Λ¯ℓ,k
) · [yℓ,k(t)− cℓf¯k]
clearly holds ∀(ℓ, k) : Λℓ,k(t) > 0, but it also holds when ∀(ℓ, k) : Λℓ,k(t) = 0. The
last part holds, because it will either be yℓ,k(t) − cℓf¯k ≥ 0 (then it is obvious) or
yℓ,k(t)− cℓf¯k < 0. In this case:(
Λℓ,k(t)− Λ¯ℓ,k
) ·max{0, yℓ,k(t)− cℓf¯k} = −Λ¯ℓ,k · 0 < −Λ¯ℓ,k · [yℓ,k(t)− cℓf¯k] .
The second inequality∑
ℓ∈L
∑
k∈K
(
Λℓ,k(t)− Λ¯ℓ,k
) · [yℓ,k(t)− y¯ℓ,k + y¯ℓ,k − cℓf¯k]
≤
∑
ℓ∈L
∑
k∈K
(
Λℓ,k(t)− Λ¯ℓ,k
) · [yℓ,k(t)− y¯ℓ,k]
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holds because for the optimal matrix of resource prices Λ¯ (for given w¯ and f¯ ) it holds
that ∑
ℓ∈L
∑
k∈K
Λ¯ℓ,k(y¯ℓ,k − cℓf¯k) = 0
(due to equation (KKT-MSC-II.c)). The third inequality
∑
p∈P
∑
k∈K
f¯kw¯p ·
[
2− xp,k(t)
x¯p,k
− x¯p,k
xp,k(t)
]
≤ 0
holds because ∀z > 0, 2− z − 1
z
≤ 0 and f¯k, ∀k ∈ K, w¯p, ∀p ∈ P are positive. ⊓⊔
